Like the mills of God,
the policymakers of the EU grind slowly. In 1996, the first shipments of US
soy beans containing genetically modified varieties came to Europe and a handful
of other crops were approved for import (and, in the case of Bt maize, cultivation).
But only two years later a de facto moratorium halted approval of further
GM events while the regulatory framework was revised. In 2004, the new system
at last creaked into action, and new approvals began to trickle down.
While there was a pretence that the whole system was science-based, it soon
became clear that this was true only as far as the advice given. EFSA, the
European Food Safety Authority, would give a positive recommendation to a
dossier, based on extensive testing and evaluation by independent scientists.
But theirs was (and remains) just a recommendation; the decision lies in the
hands of politicians. Voting takes place at Council meetings and, while some
Member States actually assess the evidence and vote accordingly, an equal
number just vote no as a matter of course.
Because decisions are made on a qualified majority basis, the result so far
has always been deadlock, with no majority either for or against a dossier.
This means that the assessment is passed back to the Commission, which takes
a much more rational approach and has always gone along with the EFSA recommendation.
But there is a caveat: the Commission approved on the basis of the evidence
while the crops were just for import but, when the BASF Amflora potato case
landed on the desk of then Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas in 2009,
he could not bring himself to follow the normal route, but passed the dossier
back to EFSA for a second opinion.
This highlighted once more the dysfunctional nature of European GMO regulation.
Until this time, there was a sort of lowest common denominator approach: nations
voting in favour of EFSA recommendations knew that approval would be given,
albeit after some delay, while opponents could turn to their voters and green
lobbyists and say that the final decision was out of their hands.
While the issue was essentially one of trade in animal feed this political
game of fudge and nudge, nudge, wink, wink could carry on with few tears.
But actually planting GM seeds (or potatoes) in European soil, actually allowing
European farmers the possibility of finally accessing technology used by other
major agricultural competitors for many years, was a step too far for DG Environment.
The solution was simple: when the new Commission was appointed, Commission
President Barroso took the initiative and moved responsibility for GM crops
to DG SANCO, under Commissioner John Dalli. In March, just a month after his
appointment, Commissioner Dalli approved the Amflora potato for cultivation
and announced his intention to allow Member States to make their own choice
as to whether to permit GM crops to be grown on their soil. Barroso showed
his intention to break the deadlock, and Dalli has taken the opportunity with
both hands.
This week, his proposals were made public, but these have pleased no-one.
The essence is to keep the science-based EU-wide approvals system but then
to allow Member States the choice of whether or not to create 'GM-free' zones
on some or all of their territory. Until now, such decisions have - at least
in theory - had to have been based on scientific issues, although in practice
various dubious grounds have been used for justification.
The new system would introduce revised coexistence recommendations which would
allow national authorities to set separation distances much greater than necessary
to meet the maximum 0.9% tolerance level in non-GM produce. There could be,
in effect, a zero tolerance of intermixing in some countries, a position which
has been argued for by many in the organic movement for years. The justification
for the proposal is that any detectable traces of GM could cause problems
for some producers, despite the fact that they breached no laws.
There are two ways of looking at this. The first sees this is a workable and
pragmatic compromise that recognises the reality of the current situation
and allows those countries that want to allow their farmers access to GM seeds
to do so, while letting others opt out in a legally justified way. According
to this view, this could be a new beginning for crop biotechnology in Europe,
finally giving many more farmers the chance to plant GM crops and see for
themselves if they find any benefits. Pro-GM optimists might even hope that
positive experience in the UK, Netherlands and elsewhere might gradually bring
the barriers down in other Member States.
In contrast, the second view is that this is an unwelcome fudge which legitimises
irrational opposition to science-based policymaking and sets a further unfortunate
precedent. Already, we have seen the new pesticide regulation under which
decisions will be made on the basis of hazard rather than risk; allowing further
circumvention of a sound scientific approach would just accelerate the EU's
progress down a path which is excessively precautionary and will stifle innovation.
Well, perhaps things are not as bad as all that, but the fact remains that
for every opportunity the pro-GM lobby sees, there will be at least one disadvantage.
In the first place, there is no reason to suppose that countries which do
not want GM crops on their soil will simply vote for approvals at EU level
because they know they can effectively ignore this after the fact. The anti-GM
lobby, with the organic movement at its forefront (the Soil Association, for
example, has just launched its GM NO! campaign) may simply see this as a sign
that the EU does not have the will to impose the current legislation across
the bloc. Rather than scale back their opposition to the technology, they
may instead go for the jugular.
There may be further problems in the single market: would dissenting countries
such as Austria and Greece allow imports of GM crops grown in the Netherlands,
as the law demands? Given the history of Member States picking and choosing
which regulations to enforce strictly, and even which directives to enact
into national law, the answer seems clear.
Nevertheless, much will now depend on the tenacity of Commissioner Dalli.
If he can really build momentum in the dysfunctional process of GM crop approvals,
as his boss clearly wishes, then the situation may change. If farmers choose
the new varieties, as they began to in France until President Sarkozy stopped
them, if the majority of consumers come to realise that good quality food
is good quality food, whatever its origins, then the pressure for a more rational
approach may build. But don't hold your breath; the mills of European policymaking
are unlikely to speed up just yet.
Source:
Next steps for crop biotechnology in Europe. Scientific Alliance
(16.7.10) (http://www.gaia-technology.com/sa/newsletters/newsletter.cfm?newsletterID=176&ID=0)
Reproduced by permission of the author.
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